"In Afghanistan, British troops were taking part in a show of military force in taking Musa Qala, a town the Taliban had previously taken over without firing a shot.
... Musa Qala, at the mountainous north of Helmland province, was ‘captured’ by the Taliban in February of this year. They achieved this ‘capture’ with the support of the local government and without a shot being fired. In effect... with the council of elders; the Taliban then brokered an agreement with the local tribal elders to keep the peace....
The battle for Musa Qala has been presented as a major success in routing an important Taliban stronghold. In truth, it had little to do with military prowess: once the decision was taken to mount an assault on Musa Qala, victory could never have been in doubt considering the imbalance in firepower. The Taliban forces withdrew before the British, American and Afghan forces entered the city. Yet the battle for Musa Qala was promoted as a victory of global importance in Gordon Brown’s speech to the troops:
"This is one of the most challenging of environments, one of the most difficult of tasks, the most testing of times, and one of the most important of missions, because to win here, and defeat the Taliban, and make sure we can give strength to the new democracy in Afghanistan, is important for defeating terrorism around the world."
.... Musa Qala may be a very visible focus for a battle with the Taliban but taking hold of the town will make very little difference to either the Taliban or to the Afghan government, ostensibly being supported by these actions. As Jean MacKenzie, Afghanistan country director for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, notes, understanding Afghanistan in terms of decisive battles against the Taliban makes little sense. While it is easy for NATO forces to take towns, the problem is that they do not have the resources to occupy them militarily in order to prevent the Taliban’s return.
MacKenzie states:
"They could not hold it before so I do not see why they will be able to hold it this time."
It is strange that [improving] the lives of the ordinary people of Musa Qala needed to be exposed to the US aerial bombardment that preceded the moving of ground forces into the town. It makes little sense to stage a large-scale battle to retake a town, which was happily given up 10 months ago and will in all likelihood be peacefully retaken later. It also does not make much sense to fight a war against the Taliban, who enjoy an element of popular support in the area around Musa Qala....
There is no doubt that the British government is equally aware that the war against the Taliban can no more be won by outside military action... The media have stated that 2,000 British troops were engaged in the battle, but in real terms it was US airpower that convinced the Taliban to leave the town.
Brown praised the British troops, but most importantly he argued that the battle of Musa Qala demonstrated the capacity of the Afghan troops and the central government and stressed that
"[The Musa Qala battle was] led on the ground by the Afghan forces themselves. There is no doubt that succeeding in Musa Qala will make a huge difference both to how people see the weakness of the Taliban in the future and the ability of the government to build, not just militarily and politically, but with social and economic progress for the people of the area."
.... The central government’s remit has never spread much beyond the capital Kabul.... As UK defence secretary Des Browne made clear, Britain is feeling increasingly isolated:
"There still is a need to meet the demands set by both the NATO and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commanders as to what the minimum amount of troops and support are. What is known as the 'requirement' has not yet been met and that is something we continue to discuss with our allies and friends in the international community."
Even the proposed ‘super envoy’ Lord Ashdown... has already publicly stated that, in his opinion, NATO has ‘lost’ in Afghanistan....
It seems clear from the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan that only the withdrawal of foreign military forces allows a process of political bargaining, which can begin to rebuild the structures necessary for securing a stable peace."
David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster and editor of the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. Visit his website here."
