"Perception management operations in which we shape the perceptions of the population, the enemy, our own side and a global audience."
The WORLD is NO LONGER BELIEVING the LIES!!!!
Nor is THIS AMERICAN, either!!!!
Oh, and by the way, it is ILLEGAL to PROPAGATE the American people, fascistas!!!
"A State Dept. Powerpoint on How to Rule the World"
"by LithiumCola
Sun May 11, 2008 at 07:28:00 AM PDT
David Kilcullen is a member of Gen. David Petraeus' famous team of intellectuals. He has served in Iraq as part of the general's cadre and is currently working for the State Department as well as in the private sector. Dr. Kilcullen has a Ph.D. in political science from the University of New South Wales and wrote his dissertation on counterinsurgency in traditional societies.
At the Department of State website devoted to collecting resources about counterinsurgency ("COIN" for short), there is a powerpoint presentation by Dr. Milcullen titled "Counterinsurgency In Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007 - by David Kilcullen." This is possibly the single most, shall we say "interesting," powerpoint presentation I have ever seen.
- LithiumCola's diary :: ::
From slide 46:
COIN ops are fundamentally perception management operations in which we shape the perceptions of the population, the enemy, our own side and a global audience. This demands a solid, realistic understanding of the environment and an ability to coordinate enormous numbers of info sources and communication tools.
"US COIN ops" is shorthand for "United States Counterinsurgency operations." US COIN ops in Iraq is operating, or anyway is being advised to operate, on a level of sophistication and deliberativeness in psychological counterinsurgency that I had not previously appreciated.
According to a surprisingly long Wikipedia entry on Dr. Kilcullen:
He is currently serving as the special adviser for counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. During 2007 he served in Iraq as Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser, Multi-National Force - Iraq, a civilian position on the personal staff of American General David Howell Petraeus, responsible for planning and executing the 2007-8 Joint Campaign Plan, which drove the Iraq War troop surge of 2007.
-- snip --
He is one of a group of highly educated, combat-experienced, civilian specialists and military officers, including Colonel H.R. McMaster and others, who were seconded in late 2006 to the personal staff of General Petraeus, to oversee the specialized counterinsurgency aspects of the Iraq campaign in 2007. He previously contributed to the new United States Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24, published in December 2006, of which he authored a chapter entitled "A Guide to Action".
Reading through the 90 often text-dense slides in Dr. Kilcullen's powerpoint, one is struck by the dispassionate insistance on total information control. Counterinsurgency is critically dependent, we are told, on unity of message "from President to the soldier, sailor, marine, or airman on the street" (slide 47). War as extended psyop, every military manuver must grow out of strategies of perception management. Everything, everything is orchestrated by concerns of information control towards the target audiences, audiences both in the country of operations and in the domestic audience back home.
In Slide 33 Dr. Kilcullen notes that there are three approches to war: enemy-centric, terrain-centric, and population-centric. In slide 34 he insists that counterinsurgency is population-centric:
Why counterinsurgency is population-centric
+This is not about being "nice" to the population, it is a hard-headed recognition of certain basic facts, to wit:
+ The enemy needs the people to act in certain ways (sympathy, acquiescence, silence, provocation) -- without this insurgents wither
+ The enemy is fluid; the population is fixed – therefore controlling the population is do-able, destroying the enemy is not
+ Being fluid, the enemy can control his loss rate and can never be eradicated by purely enemy-centric means (e.g. Vietnam VC losses)
+ In any given area, there are multiple threat groups but only one local population – the enemy may not be identifiable but the population is.
Slide 46:
Components of the Information Dimension
+Intelligence – tactical, operational, political, economic, strategic
++Information collection – geographical, cultural, economic, governance, infrastructure, agricultural, media landscape, local political and social landscape
+ +Information Ops – psychological ops, military deception, operational security, computer network operations, electronic warfare
+ +Public Diplomacy – education, media engagement, visits, legislative liaison, think tank engagement, long-term perception shaping
+ +Public Affairs – local media, regional media, global media, homeland
+ +Joint Influence Operations – combination of physical + informational
+ + COIN ops are fundamentally perception management operations in which we shape the perceptions of the population, the enemy, our own side and a global audience. This demands a solid, realistic understanding of the environment and an ability to coordinate enormous numbers of info sources and communication tools.
Slide 47:
Shaping Perceptions
+ Virtually every action, message, and decision by a force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population, to include how coalition personnel treat civilians during cordon and search operations, the accuracy or inaccuracy of aerial bombardment, and the treatment of detainees. Unity of message is key in this regard. The panoply of U.S. force actions must be synchronized across the operational battlespace to the extent possible so as not to conflict with statements made in communications at every level from President to the soldier, sailor, marine, or airman on the street. Given the inherent difficulty in unifying the American and coalition message across disparate organizations, within and across governments and over time, these shaping efforts must be designed, wargamed, and conducted as a campaign. The goal of such a shaping campaign is to foster positive attitudes among the populace for U.S. and allied forces. These attitudes, while not the goal in and of themselves, help decrease anti-coalition behaviors and motivate the population to act in ways that facilitate friendly force operational objectives and the attainment of desired end states. + +
But we should back up. What is a counterinsurgency operation?
Slide 5:
Insurgency: an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict...an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.
Counterinsurgency: military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.
Slide 14:
The fundamental problem is CONTROL – of people, terrain and information.
Slide 24:
Narrative as a weapon
+People are not mobilized individually, by cold consideration of rational facts
+They are mobilized in groups, by influencers and opinion leaders, through cultural narratives that include 7 basic elements:
1.A simple, easily expressed story or explanation for events
2.A choice of words and story format that resonates with the target group
3.Symbolic imagery that creates an emotional bond (ideally at the unconscious level)
4.Elements of Myth ("sacred story") that tap into deep cultural undercurrents of identity and appeal to universal ideals
5.A basis in, or a call to action (ideally, action that lies within the immediate capacity of the listeners)
6.Credibility built on a high degree of consistency between what is said, what is done, and what is seen
7.A future focus that inspires people to mortgage current self-interest for future benefits
In reading through this powerpoint, I was struck by the extent to which it could easily be re-titled How to Rule the World. A military -- in particular a military larger than the rest of the world's militaries combines, give or take -- devoted primarily to counterinsurgency is a military devoted to neo-imperialism. I take this as obvious.
As Defense Secretary Gates said in April:
What has been called the `long war' is likely to be many years of persistent, engaged combat all around the world in differing degrees of size and intensity. This generational challenge cannot be wished away or put on a timetable. There are no exit strategies.
Tom Engelhardt recently called this long war, hauntingly, "the war in the slum cities of the planet." I add only that the war-planners see this war as a war for populations, not to be "nice" to them, as Dr. Kilcullen notes, but to "control" them. And this is true in the slums of Iraq and in the skyscrapers of Chicago, both. This war has no exit strategities because it has no boundaries.
So how do you rule the world?
Slide 46:
COIN ops are fundamentally perception management operations in which we shape the perceptions of the population, the enemy, our own side and a global audience.
Slide 14:
The fundamental problem is CONTROL – of people, terrain and information."
Which is why you fellas are going to lose!!!!
Also see: Who Is Philip Zelikow?
Prop 101: The "Terrorism" Business
Prop 101: Al-CIA-Duh and the OSI
New York Times Admits War on Terror is U.S. Creation
