"On Friday I asked a top-level Israeli, a former IDF (Israel Defense Forces) elite unit man and prime-ministerial confidante, whether the assassination of Hezbollah's Imad Mughniyeh could have been done by a Lebanese group.
He snorted at the preposterous notion. This was "way too sophisticated," he said. "This [the car bombing] was a precisely orchestrated international operation," and this was the "third or fourth or fifth time in a year that Israel has carried out a military operation in Syria."
When I asked him to repeat that last part he added the word "allegedly."
But the message, or at least the boast, was clear. So why is Israel doing this?
The man said of his colleagues: "There are a lot of [Israeli] military and cabinet people just dying for a second round with Lebanon. If given the opportunity they'll take it," i.e. attack Lebanon again, not in spite of "but because of" the perception that their '06 attack failed.
Though the IDF leveled blocks and villages, dropped 4 million cluster bomblets (some of which are still exploding), and killed some 200 Hezbollah combatants and 1,000 Lebanese civilians (roughly 40 Israeli civilians were killed by Hezbollah), they apparently departed Lebanon feeling politically inadequate.
The official feeling was that they either did not destroy enough, or destroy enough of the right people and items, to avoid the embarrassing perception that they lost to Hezbollah.
So to have the option of solving this problem they've apparently staged a provocative assassination in hopes of goading Hezbollah into retaliating and providing a pretext for new -- better -- destruction that this time around will "succeed," i.e. soothe hurt Israeli feelings.
There've been attempts to put this in strategic terms, as educated killers (and those who study them) prefer. 'Israel must prove its strategic value to the United States' (What? Washington is going to dump Israel? Hezbollah's "victory" strengthened the Palestinians, or Lebanon, or put Israel's existence in danger?). Or, alternatively: 'Hezbollah must be eradicated' (which everyone knows is impossible).
In fact, the closer you look the more it looks like leaders' blood psychotherapy.
And the same thing goes for the publics that follow them. Olmert is in political trouble. If he doesn't kill some Arabs soon (who or where is secondary), his governing coalition may well dissolve. The public has to feel good, too.
The problem -- for the to-be-killed, and for the notion of murder law, not to mention (and few do) decency -- is that the Israeli body politic is now set this way: demanding -- with a few, brave, exceptions -- not just daily, routine, killings of Palestinians, but periodic dramatic strikes that thrill and let them strut like hero/ victims.
It's as if the inhabitants of a US Fox News studio had multiplied and become a nation.
It, of course, doesn't have to be that way, but it is obviously that way now. All you have to do to see it is pick up the papers or talk to a few Israelis. (For representative quotations see Gideon Levy, "Little Ahmadinejads, Haaretz," 10/06/2007).
Its one thing for a state to be murdering and/or oppressing others when their local public doesn't know about it (as was largely the case when Washington was decimating Central America in the 1980s), but it's another when the public knows about it and supports the injustices and crimes (as was the case with US whites and slavery, and in the first stages of US/Iraq, where public support seemed to turn -- as it may still -- on the question of whether the US was "winning").
In the first situation, the killing policy is vulnerable. If word gets out, the public might be angry. But in the second it is more stable, and deadly, since the public knows, and asks for more.
But people and states don't get to entirely write their own histories.
They usually interact with others.
In the case of Israel, the key interaction is with the US, their military guarantor/ mass subsidizer, and with American Jews, where, among the young, opinion appears to be slowly turning The Army in Indonesia. Questions of Logic and Activism," and February 13, 2008, "Big Killer Takes Out Smaller One. 'Wipe Out a Neighborhood.' Life by Mafia Rules in the Israeli - US Domain," particularly the plaint of Malcom Hoenlein.).
Alternatively, Palestinians and groups like Hezbollah and Hamas could join the US as important determinants, but only if they too reset their outlooks (and their willingness to kill or murder) -- as some Palestinians and other Arabs at the grassroots level are now urging, cautiously -- and switched to active, but non-violent, or minimally violent resistance (like the first intifada, or the Gaza wall-breaking) and stopped letting themselves be used as a "provocation-response" button that Israel can press when it wants a thrill."
"Israel, US discuss NATO invasion of West Bank"Doesn't NATO already have enough to do?
"The United States is reviewing the feasibility of deploying a NATO force in the West Bank as a way to ease IDF security concerns and facilitate an Israeli withdrawal from the area within the coming years, defense officials have told The Jerusalem Post.
The plan, which is being spearheaded by US Special Envoy to the region Gen. James Jones, is being floated among European countries, which could be asked to contribute troops to a West Bank multinational force.
Jones, a former commander of NATO, was sent to Israel in November to help the Israelis and Palestinians frame some of the security mechanics necessary for a broader peace agreement.
As first reported in the Post last month, Jones's plan calls for stationing third-party troops in the West Bank to secure the area in the interim period following an Israeli withdrawal and before the Palestinian Authority can take over full security control.
"The deployment of such a force has come up in talks, and Jones is known to be working on it," a senior defense official said Tuesday. "At the moment, it's just an idea and has yet to be accepted or adopted by Israel."
Defense Minister Ehud Barak has met with Jones and been briefed on the plan, but has yet to finalize his position. An official close to Barak said the deployment of a multinational force in the West Bank could create operational challenges for the IDF if it decided to respond to Palestinian terror attacks following the withdrawal.
One of the issues that most concerns Israel is whether under such a withdrawal, the IDF would retain its operational freedom in the West Bank despite the presence of the multinational force.
"If they fire a Kassam rocket into Israel, will we be able to respond, or will we need to rely on the foreign troops stationed there?" one defense official asked.
On Tuesday, US Ambassador to Israel Richard Jones hinted at the possibility of deploying an international force for the period following a withdrawal and until the PA could ensure security in the West Bank.
Speaking at a meeting of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Jones also predicted that it would take several years before any such plan was implemented.
"This is going to be a long, hard slog," he said. "But once a mutually accepted vision is accepted, both sides will accept the reality and encourage each side to work towards goals set out by the road map."
Meanwhile Tuesday, Spanish Ambassador to Israel Eudaldo Mirapeix dismissed a report that appeared in the Post, according to which Israel was concerned that Spain planned to withdraw its forces from UNIFIL in the coming year.
"I wish to inform you that the Spanish government has not considered or hinted in any way whatsoever at withdrawing the Spanish troops deployed in UNIFIL," Mirapeix said.
In the report, high-ranking defense officials expressed concern that the political deadlock in Lebanon and Hizbullah threats to renew hostilities with Israel could cause European countries to gradually begin reducing their participation in UNIFIL.
Spain, whose soldiers have come under repeated attacks by terrorists in Lebanon, was mentioned by the officials as a country that might be planning to withdraw its troops from UNIFIL, a move that could have a domino effect and topple the entire peacekeeping force."
"Related
Gaza medical situation heads for disaster
98 Palestinian patients, including 17 Children, die due to the Gaza siege
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BY MARK TURNER
20 February 2008
ISRAEL has dramatically intensified its military campaign in the Gaza Strip, stepping up air strikes and shelling of the beleaguered coastal strip.
UN officials and human rights advocates warn that Gazans now face a humanitarian disaster of unprecedented magnitude with widespread disease and famine rapidly becoming reality as electricity generation, water supply, sewage treatment, food supplies and medical services grind to a halt as a consequence of the ever tighter Israeli blockade.
Israel claims its recent moves are retaliation for continued rocket attacks originating in Gaza that despite their consistency cause scant damage and few actual casualties. But the reasons may include motivations with roots back in 2000, when the British firm British Gas Group (BG) discovered proven natural gas reserves of at least 1.3 trillion cubic feet beneath Gazan territorial waters worth nearly $4 billion.
The Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF), a financial holdings company owned primarily by independent Palestinian shareholders, is investing in the project and heads the negotiations in coordination with Mahmoud Abbas' government in the West Bank. BG won a majority stake in the concession to develop the Gaza Marine Field and originally targeted Egypt for the sale of the natural gas. But pressure from then-British prime minister Tony Blair led the company to redirect its efforts towards Israel and develop plans for an underwater pipeline that would transport the gas to an Israeli refinery at Ashkelon. That deal could have eventually provided Israel with approximately 10 per cent of its annual energy requirement, and would have generated approximately $1 billion for the PIF. The Hamas election victory in 2006 put all that in jeopardy.
The Palestine Investment Fund was set up by Salam Fayyad, a World Bank veteran lauded by the United States as a practical thinker and fiscal reformist who would deliver transparency to the Palestinian Authority's financial dealings. In 2003, then PA Finance Minister Fayyad consolidated a varied collection of Palestinian Authority holdings into the fund audited by Standard & Poor's and now valued at an estimated $1.3 billion. The fund's portfolio includes Palestine's most profitable company, Paltel, and serves as the primary vehicle for private investment in Palestinian sustainable infrastructure.
The PIF is ostensibly overseen by the Palestinian Authority; revenue generated by the fund could potentially be available to a Hamas-led government. Through the deal structured with the PIF, BG owns 90 per cent of the Gaza Marine license. Consolidated Contractors Company, a Palestinian owned construction firm, owns the remaining 10 per cent. The Palestinian Authority retains an option to take a stake in the concession once production is sanctioned. After the 2006 Palestinian election results, Israel began stalling in its negotiations with BG. Any deal that could result in funds reaching Gaza would seriously undermine official Israeli policy towards Hamas. For its part, Hamas assured it would not interrupt development of the project, but reserved its right to restructure parts of the deal it deemed harmful to Palestinian interests. In an interview with Dow Jones Newswires, Minister of Economy Ziad al-Zaza reiterated Hamas opposition to any sale of fuel to Israel.
After the Hamas election victory, Israel embarked on an intense campaign to eliminate the movement as a viable political entity in Gaza while at the same time attempting to rehabilitate the defeated Fatah as the dominant political player in the West Bank. By leveraging political tensions between the two parties, arming forces loyal to Abbas and the selective resumption of financial aid, Israel and the United States effectively re-installed Fatah in the West Bank, projected the party back onto the international stage and revived the possibility of concluding the energy deal.
With Hamas isolated geographically in Gaza, Israeli policy focused on isolating it politically as well. Israel has made significant progress toward this goal. Fayyad was appointed prime minister of the new unelected West Bank government recognised by the West, and by April 2007 the Israeli cabinet had reversed an earlier decision to prohibit the purchase of natural gas from the Palestinian Authority. But with 1.5 million people living in the Gaza Strip, Hamas retains significant influence in the Palestinian political arena. Israel will have to eliminate the party completely in order to create a political climate suited to accommodate the BG deal. Time is running out.
In January, BG announced it was pulling the plug on negotiations with Israel due to the long impasse, and was again considering Egypt as a buyer. The Egyptian option includes liquefying up to a third of the gas for export to the US and Europe. BG announced plans to close its office near Tel Aviv at the end of January and sell its share in Israel's offshore Med Yavne natural gas field. Since the announcement, Israel has radically expanded its sanctions, cut fuel shipments entirely and stepped up its military campaign. Increased air strikes and use of internationally proscribed tank shell ammunition has led to a drastic increase in civilian deaths and injuries in hopes of eroding support for Hamas in Gaza. Combined with dangerous shortages of food, water and basic supplies, the coastal region has fallen into catastrophe. Israel and the United States refuse to acknowledge the growing chorus of international condemnation. Appeals from Ramallah lack the popular mobilisation needed to effectively advocate an end to the Israeli siege. Regardless of the future of the Gaza Marine Field, Gazans can be sure they will be denied any relief it might once have afforded them.
International human rights activist Mark Turner recently returned from a nine-month stay in Balata Refugee Camp in the West Bank city of Nablus. This article first appeared in The Electronic Intifada (http://electronicintifada.net)"
"Israeli army rolls into SE Gaza Strip"
"Israeli troops rolled into southeastern Gaza Strip on Thursday amid heavy machine gunfire, sparking reactions from Palestinian fighters, witnesses said.....
Israeli bulldozers caused damage to makeshift houses and groves. Israel forces often roll into al-Shouka, a small community alongside the border with Israel."
How come it takes the Chinese to report this stuff?
"Israeli diplomats warn Syria that Israeli is planning a major Hezbollah offensive in Southern Lebanon"
"Defense Minister Ehud Barak has warned Syria through Turkish mediation that the Israel Defense Forces is planning to escalate its military operations against Hezbollah and Hamas, the London-based daily Al-Hayyat reported on Thursday.
On his visit to Turkey last week, Barak asked Turkish President Abdullah Ghoul to urge Syrian President Bashar Assad to adopt a different stance toward Hezbollah, according to Al-Hayyat.
The defense minister reportedly informed Turkey of Israel's intentions to widen its operation in Gaza and asked the Turkish leader to consider sending troops on an international mission to Gaza geared toward ending Qassam rocket fire and protecting the border.
This multi-national force will comprise representatives from Qatar, Malaysia and Jordan, according to the report.
The Defense Ministry has refused to respond to the report, which it said was the result of leaked information.
Barak said Tuesday that he anticipated Hezbollah would try to retaliate for last week's assassination of terrorist mastermind Imad Mughniyah, possibly with help from Syria and Iran.
Hezbollah blamed Israel for the attack and pledged to attack Jewish targets worldwide in revenge.
The U.S. intelligence chief has said, however, that internal Hezbollah factions or Syria may be to blame for Mughniyah's death.
Israel to extend 800 Turkish work permits given in exchange for tank upgrades
The government will approve Defense Minister Ehud Barak's proposal to extend the working permits of 800 Turkish workers in Israel.
The workers in question were part of a deal that was signed between Israel and Turkey three years ago in which Israel upgraded Turkish tanks at the cost of 700 million dollars and in turn gave working permits to 800Turkish workers.
During Barak's visit to Ankara last week, Turkish officials asked that the work permits be extended and Barak agreed.
"Israel agreed to the request due to the strategic importance of our ties with Turkey," an official in the Defense Ministry said Wednesday.
Five months ago, the High Court dismissed a petition of the Turks-for-tanks deal. In the petition, the Hotline for Migrant Workers said that the deal is nothing more than state-sponsored Human trafficking.
While Justice Eliezer Rivlin agreed that the agreement was problematic he dismissed the petition since the deal was both unique and temporary."
